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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS1 BODY & PAINT, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and BRYAN 
CIIRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs • 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants-Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 890540-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). Plaintiffs bring this appeal 
from the June 12, 1989 Order by the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Company and Leon Maxwell, and dismissing with 
prejudice plaintiffs' complaint against defendants. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' second cause of action for 
defamation? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' third cause of action for 
tortious interference with business relations? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§45-2-3(3), 45-2-4, 
and 76-9-506 (1953), Utah Insurance Department Regulation 
R540-89-ll(H), and Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
determinative on appeal. The text of each provision is set forth 
in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. and Bryan 
Christensen, brought suit against defendants, State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company and Leon Maxwell, asserting three causes of 
action: violation of the Utah Anti-Trust Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-911 et seq. (Supp. 1989), defamation and tortious interfer-
ence with business relations. On June 12, 1989, the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya presiding, granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment and entered judgment in favor of defendants and against 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. Plaintiffs now seek judicial 
review of Judge Sawayafs June 12, 1989 Order. 
This action arises out of the business relationship 
between plaintiffs' automobile body repair shop, an automobile 
liability insurer, State Farm, its employee, Leon Maxwell, and 
various State Farm insureds and claimants. Defendant State Farm 
is in the business of insuring automobile owners and operators in 
the State of Utah and in adjusting damage to its insureds' vehi-
cles and vehicles damaged by its insureds' negligence. At all 
pertinent times, State Farm has utilized a market survey technique 
to establish a prevailing competitive rate for repair work done by 
automobile body shops in Salt Lake County. R. 40-44. Since the 
amounts expended by State Farm to repair its insureds' and 
claimants' vehicles forms a critical factor in setting State 
Farm's automobile liability insurance rates in the State of Utah, 
the use of prevailing competitive rate surveys protects and pro-
motes State Farm's own economic interest, as well as the economic 
interests of its insureds, by securing the most reasonable and 
economical repair services available. Id. 
Plaintiffs' automobile body repair shop opened for busi-
ness in August, 1976. R. 138 at pp. 199-205, 242 at pp. 14-15. 
During the first few years of plaintiffs' business, State Farm 
insureds and claimants made up approximately 15-20% of plaintiffs' 
business. Ic3. During the majority of the 13 years of plaintiffs' 
business, State Farm insureds and claimants have comprised 
approximately 15-25% of plaintiffs' business. I_d. As can be 
expected, the amount of repair work done by plaintiffs for any one 
insurer, including State Farm, normally and customarily fluctuates 
from time to time. R. 238 at pp. 199-205, 242 at pp. 15-17. 
During 1985, State Farm's Utah Division had 69,093 
reported claims, in 1986 the number of reported claims declined 
to 66,247, and in 1987 the number of reported claims continued to 
decline to 65,847, more than a 4.7% decrease from 1985. R. 
213-15. During that same time period, plaintiffs performed 177 
repairs for State Farm insureds/claimants in 1985 (.0025% of the 
total available reported claims), 127 repairs in 1986 (.0019% of 
the total available reported claims), and 93 repairs in 1987 
(.0014% of the total available reported claims). R. 238 at p. 201. 
During the course of State Farm's dealings with 
plaintiffs' repair shop, defendants have detected through their 
marketing surveys that plaintiffs often charge more for their 
services than their competitors, and often charge more than the 
prevailing competitive rate, as determined by State Farm's 
surveys. R. 32-30, 96-106, 241 at pp. 80-81. 
Over the course of the parties' dealings, State Farm and 
State Farm's employees have been subjected to verbal abuse and 
derision by plaintiffs. R. 32-44, 96-110. As a result of the 
escalating difficulties between State Farm and plaintiffs, State 
Farm was forced to implement a program designed to arrive at a 
mutually-agreeable repair estimate. R. 35-44, 103-06. State Farm 
adopted a program whereby it instructed its insureds and claimants 
desiring to have their vehicles repaired at plaintiffs' shop to 
obtain two or three other competitive bids from other auto body 
repair shops in Salt Lake County. .Id. The amount State Farm 
would then pay to repair its insureds' or claimants' vehicles 
would be the equivalent of the lowest of the several bids 
received. 
After State Farm implemented this competitive bid system, 
plaintiffs refused and continue to refuse to permit other 
competing auto body shops to render competitive bids on plaintiffs' 
property. R. 35-44, 100-102, 2328 at pp. 194, 242 at pp. 169. As 
a result of plaintiffs' refusal to permit competing auto body 
repair shops on their premises to provide competitive bids, and 
plaintiffs' repeated refusal to accept State Farm's estimates, 
without excessive supplemental estimates, State Farm and its 
insureds and claimants have been greatly inconvenienced. R. 
32-44, 96-110. Plaintiffs' misconduct has required State Farm's 
employees to spend substantially more time, which in turn involves 
significantly greater expense, in servicing claims handled by 
plaintiffs than by other automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake 
County. Id. 
During the course of State Farm's lengthy business deal-
ings with plaintiffs' shop, State Farm has also documented numer-
ous times in which plaintiffs have deviated from the repair 
estimates submitted to them by State Farm insureds and claimants. 
R. 32-39, 107-110, 238 at pp. 186-88. Plaintiffs have at times 
failed to supply certain repairs or parts when specifically called 
for under State Farm's estimates and for which State Farm has 
compensated plaintiffs. icL Likewise, plaintiffs have at times 
utilized used or repaired parts while charging State Farm and 
other insurers for the cost of new parts. R. 238 at pp. 186-88. 
On or about November 19, 1987, plaintiffs brought suit 
against defendants asserting violations of the Utah Anti-Trust 
Act, defamation and tortious interference with business relations. 
Plaintiffs' complaint asserted claims of a "conspiracy" between 
State Farm and its employee, Leon Maxwell, claims of illegal 
channeling of State Farm insureds and claimants to other automo-
bile body repair shops, claims of using market surveys to estab-
lish a prevailing competitive rate, and claims of certain 
allegedly defamatory statements made to State Farm insureds and 
claimants during the adjusting process. R. 2-10. 
Following extensive discovery, defendants moved for 
summary judgment on plaintiffs' complaint. For purposes of the 
motion, defendants assumed the allegations of plaintiffs' com-
plaint to be true. R. 47-48. The parties submitted various 
affidavits in conjunction with defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. Following extensive oral argument, the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
presiding, on June 1, 1989 issued a Memorandum Decision granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. An order of summary 
judgment was entered in favor of defendants on June 12, 1989. R. 
225-26. 
Plaintiffs now appeal from the June 12, 1989 Order 
summarily dismissing their claims with prejudice. On appeal, 
plaintiffs apparently confess no error in the trial court's 
granting of summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim under the Utah 
Anti-Trust Act. See Appellants' Brief. This Court's review of 
the trial court's ruling is limited to the dismissal of 
plaintiffs' claims of defamation and tortious interference with 
business relations. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs alleged in the court below that plaintiffs 
"established and carried out a continuous and willful plan of 
defamation." Plaintiffs attribute various allegedly defamatory 
statements to defendants, including statements concerning the 
quality of plaintiffs' work, the prices that plaintiffs charged 
for their work, and plaintiffs' business practices. 
Plaintiffs' cause of action for defamation fails for sev-
eral reasons. First, the allegedly defamatory statements were 
privileged; second, the statements were expressions of non-
actionable opinion; third, the statements did not impute any spe-
cific criminal offense involving infamy or moral turpitude; and 
lastly, the statements were substantiated in truth and fact. 
Plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with business 
relations was likewise properly dismissed. Plaintiffs failed to 
produce any evidence that defendants' conduct was for an improper 
purpose or by improper means. In fact, defendants' actions were 
for the legitimate and proper purpose of protecting their own 
interests, as well as those of State Farm's insureds. The means 
used by defendants in promoting and achieving such legitimate 
goals were wholly proper under Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF DEFAMATION. 
In the trial court below, plaintiffs generally alleged 
that defendants "established and carried out a continuous and 
willful plan of defamation." R. 6. Specifically, plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants defamed them in the following manner: 
1. Defendants told customers and potential 
customers of plaintiffs that plaintiffs 
did inferior work; 
2. Defendants told customers and potential 
customers of plaintiffs that plaintiffs' 
prices were too high; 
3. Defendants told customers, potential cus-
tomers and others that plaintiffs were 
dishonest or "crooks"; and 
4. Defendants told customers and potential 
customers of plaintiffs that plaintiffs' 
shop should be avoided and that other 
shops performed better automobile repairs. 
R. 6-7. Plaintiffs further alleged that they sustained 
irreparable damage to their "reputation in the automobile body and 
paint repair industries" and "in the community at large" as a 
result of the alleged statements. R. 7. 
In reviewing the trial court's granting of summary judg-
ment in favor of defendants, it is important to note that for pur-
poses of the motion for summary judgment, defendants assumed the 
truthfulness of the allegations contained in plaintiffs' 
complaint. R. 47-48. As a result, the issue squarely before 
this Court is not a determination of whether genuine issues of 
material fact exist, but whether defendants are entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law under the undisputed facts in this case. 
Simply put, this Court need only determine whether the trial court 
committed error in applying the law to the facts in this case. 
A. The Allegedly Defamatory Statement Attributed 
to Defendants Were Privileged. 
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs' allegations of 
defamation are true, the undisputed facts in this case establish 
that all of the statements attributed to defendants were published 
to State Farm's insureds and claimants who were seeking to have 
State Farm appraise, adjust and pay for the damage to their 
automobiles. Plaintiff Bryan Christensen admits that defendants' 
statements were made solely to persons with whom defendants had a 
contractual or legal duty to appraise, adjust, and pay for 
damages. R. 238 at pp. 117-188. While defendants' statements 
might be actionable in other contexts, Utah law clearly shields 
defendants from liability under the facts of this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Carter v. Jackson, 10 Utah 2d 
284, 351 P.2d 957, 958 (1960), recognized the existence of two 
classes of privileged communications: absolute and qualified/con-
ditional. In Carter, the defendant city councilman allegedly 
defamed the plaintiff, a police officer, in a city council 
meeting by claiming that plaintiff had propositioned a woman to 
whom he issued a traffic citation. The trial court directed a 
verdict in favor of the defendant. In affirming the lower court's 
action, the Utah Supreme Court found that the defendant's state-
ments were absolutely privileged since they were uttered in an 
official proceeding of the city council. In recognizing the exis-
tence of privileged communications, the court stated: 
In the case of absolutely privileged communi-
cations the utterance or publication, although 
both false and malicious, does not give rise to 
a cause of action. In the case of a qualified 
or conditional privilege the law raises merely 
a prima facie presumption in favor of the 
occasion. 
Id. 
Utah Code Ann. §45-2-3(3) (1953) sets forth those 
communications that are privileged by statute, including 
communications between persons having a "common interest" in a 
particular subject matter: 
A privileged publication or broadcast which 
shall not be considered as libelous or slan-
derous per se, is one made: 
* * * 
(3) In a communication, without 
malice, to a person interested 
therein, by one who is also 
interested, or by one who stands 
in such relation to the person 
interested as to afford a reason-
able ground for supposing the 
motive for the communication 
innocent, or who is requested by 
the person interested to give the 
information. 
Under the common interest privilege, malice is not inferred from 
the mere fact of the communication or publication. Utah Code 
Ann. §45-2-4 (1953). See also, Utah Code Ann. §76-9-506 (1953) 
The court in Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co., 67 N.C.App. 271, 312 S.E.2d 905 (1984), addressed 
allegations similar to those made by plaintiffs in this action. 
In Williams, the plaintiff, the owner of a body shop, brought suit 
against defendant State Farm and two State Farm claims agents. 
The dispute originally arose out of the repair of an automobile. 
Plaintiff had prepared a repair estimate on a State Farm insured 
vehicle. State Farm, however, refused to accept the estimate and 
offered plaintiff a lower amount to repair the vehicle. After 
plaintiff refused to repair the automobile for the price State 
Farm offered to pay, the vehicle was then repaired by another 
shop. The final cost of repair exceeded plaintiff's original 
estimate. Plaintiff also introduced evidence that defendants' 
claims agents had on at least four occasions attempted to discour-
age persons from having plaintiff repair their vehicles. The 
agents' communications included statements that State Farm had 
experienced trouble working with plaintiff in the past and pre-
ferred not to work with him in the future, and that plaintiff put 
used parts in cars while charging State Farm for new parts. The 
trial court directed a verdict in favor of State Farm. 
In affirming the lower court's actions, the North 
Carolina court stated: 
If statements are slanderous per se, the 
question arises of whether they were qualifiedly 
privileged. 
A qualified or conditionally privileged 
communication is one made in good faith 
on any subject matter in which the person 
communicating has an interest, or in refer-
ence to which he has a right or duty, if 
made to a person having a corresponding 
interest or duty on a privileged occasion 
and in a manner and under circumstances 
fairly warranted by the occasion and duty, 
right, or interest. The essential elements 
thereof are . . . good faith, an interest 
to be upheld, a statement limited in its 
scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, 
and publication in a proper manner and to 
proper parties only. 
Stewart v. Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 285, 182 
S.E.2d 410, 415 (1971) (quoting 50 Am.Jur.2d 
Libel and Slander, §195 (1970)). If a qualified 
privilege exists, plaintiff has the burden of 
proving actual malice to destroy the qualified 
privilege. 
* * * 
The thrust of the above conversations is that 
defendants had trouble working with plaintiff 
in the past and preferred not to work with him 
in the future. There is no question that 
plaintiff and defendants had disputes over 
repair work. Further, the only specific 
instance mentioned by defendant Cox was that 
plaintiff put used parts in cars and charged 
defendant State Farm for new parts. Plaintiff 
admitted that he did this and that if there was 
excess money he gave it to the customer. Since 
plaintiff admitted the truth of the statements 
made by defendants, the remarks were not 
actionable as slander. The court thus correctly 
granted directed verdict for defendant as to 
the slander claim. 
* * * 
Defendant State Farm had a legitimate business 
interest in getting automobiles which it insured 
repaired correctly and for the lowest price. 
Williams, 312 S.E.2d at 908-09. 
The Utah Supreme Court has likewise recognized the "com-
mon interest" privilege. In Hales v. Commercial Bank, 114 Utah 
186, 197 P.2d 910 (1948), the plaintiff sued defendant bank for 
defamation. Plaintiff's mother had received a $40 old age assis-
tance check from the State of Utah. The bank received the check 
after it had been altered in several respects, including a forged 
endorsement. After the check was returned unpaid to the bank, the 
bank and the State of Utah began an investigation. Defendant's 
employee, Dixon, allegedly made defamatory statements about 
plaintiff to plaintiff's brother and a Max Packard. Packard's 
name also appeared as an endorsement on the back of the check. 
The employee allegedly told plaintiff's brother and Packard that 
plaintiff was suspected of the forgery. A jury returned a verdict 
in favor of defendant. 
On appeal, plaintiff sought reversal of the judgment, 
claiming that the trial court had committed error by instructing 
the jury that the communications were privileged as a matter of 
law. In affirming the trial court's instruction, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted: 
Packard and the bank were both victims of the 
forgery . . . . Packard and the bank were both 
legally interested in the communication which 
would relate to the identity of the perpetrator 
of the fraud. The statute [the predecessor 
section to Utah Code Ann. §76-9-506 (1953)] 
merely requires that both persons be interested 
in the communication which contains the defama-
tory matter. 
* * * 
Unquestionably defendants had such an interest 
in the subject matter as to bring them clearly 
within [the privilege]. The evidence is undis-
puted that defendant bank had been defrauded by 
means of a forged endorsement, in the face amount 
of Hales' check. The perpetrator of the act 
which defrauded the bank was subject to penalty 
under the penal code of this state as well as 
liable in an action for damages. 
Likewise, Packard's knowledge of the suspicions 
of defendant Dixon as to the guilty party would 
in all likelihood be of service in the lawful 
protection of the bank's interest. Packard's 
endorsement had been forged on the check. Not 
only might Packard have the signature of the 
suspect, but he might have information or means 
of obtaining information as to whether the 
suspect might have ready access to instruments 
bearing Packard's genuine signature from which 
a carbon tracing was made on the check. Within 
the rule cited, the communication to Packard 
was clearly conditionally privileged, and the 
court did not err in so instructing the jury. 
Hales, 197 P.2d at 913-14. 
Likewise, in Knight v. Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 242, 436 
P.2d 801 (1968), the court recognized a conditional privilege for 
communications made pursuant to a business relationship. In 
Knight, plaintiff and defendant became business partners in a 
motel business. During an audit of the motel's business records, 
defendant became suspicious that plaintiff had embezzled certain 
funds. Plaintiff denied defendant's accusations of embezzlement. 
Defendant then told two individuals, Campbell and Warner, that 
plaintiff had embezzled funds. Campbell was an employee of a 
finance company from whom plaintiff had obtained a loan, and for 
which defendant had co-signed. Warner was plaintiff's attorney. 
Defendant made his statement to Warner during a discussion about 
the merits of the lawsuit brought by plaintiff. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
In affirming the lower court's granting of summary judg-
ment, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the defendant's 
communication to Campbell was privileged since the parties to the 
action and Campbell were involved together in a business 
transaction. Knight, 436 P.2d at 802. The court also found that 
the defendant's statements to plaintiff's attorney were 
privileged. 1(3. at 803, 
The determination of whether a communication is privi-
leged may be properly decided by a trial court as a matter of 
law. Combes v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 
272 (1951). In Combes, plaintiff was allegedly defamed by 
defendant, who performed a spot check on plaintiff's compliance 
with the rules and procedure of his employer. Defendant 
allegedly told two of plaintiff's co-workers that money was miss-
ing from the cash register and inquired as to plaintiff's 
honesty. After the close of trial, the trial court entered a 
directed verdict for the defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, and held that the trial 
court did not err in determining as a matter of law that the 
communications were privileged. The court stated: 
Where the facts regarding the circumstances 
of publication are substantially without 
dispute as here, the existence of a condi-
tional privilege is a question for the court. 
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 619, Hales v. 
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, Utah 1948, 
197 P.2d 910, 913. If there is any dispute 
about the facts, they are to be determined 
by the jury. Newell, Slander and Libel, 
4th Ed. Sec. 395. 
Combes, 228 P.2d at 274-75 (emphasis added). In this case, the 
evidence is undisputed that all of the communications relied upon 
by plaintiff fall within the "common interest" privilege. 
In order to overcome the conditional privilege accorded 
to the alleged statements of defendants, plaintiffs in this case 
had to plead and prove excessive or malicious publication of the 
defamatory statements. Knight, 436 P.2d at 802; Combes, 228 P.2d 
at 277; Utah Code Ann. §§45-2-3(3), 45-2-4, 76-9-506 (1953). 
The trial court was correct in finding that plaintiffs failed to 
produce any evidence of excessive or malicious publication. The 
mere fact that a statement may be false and defamatory is insuf-
ficient to establish that defendants acted maliciously. Fong v. 
Merena, 655 P.2d 875 (Hawaii 1982); Lillig v. Becton-Dickinson, 
105 Wash.2d 653, 717 P.2d 1371 (1986). The affidavits submitted 
by defendants clearly established that the alleged statements 
made by defendants were made in good faith. Plaintiffs fail to 
cite this court to any evidence in the record that defendants 
acted with ill will or malice in making the allegedly defamatory 
statements. Plaintiffs' failure to establish the requisite 
malice required to overcome the conditional privilege enjoyed by 
defendants in communicating with their insureds and/or claimants 
is sufficient ground for affirming the trial court's action. 
In Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that summary judgment is proper in a defama-
tion action where a plaintiff fails to oppose the motion by 
providing some evidentiary basis for claiming that the statements 
were made maliciously. In Lind, plaintiffs, the president and 
corporate attorney of A.N.R. Corporation, brought suit against 
defendant Lynch, a stockholder in the same corporation. Plain-
tiffs brought their action after defendant mailed a proxy solicita-
tion to the stockholders of the corporation claiming that the 
plaintiffs were guilty of fraud, deceit and conspiracy. The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding 
that the defendant's statements were conditionally privileged 
since the parties shared a common business interest. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that the 
statements fell within a conditional privilege, but remanded the 
action back to the trial court for a determination of whether the 
publication was made with malice. In reaching its decision, the 
court noted that the defendant would have been entitled to prevail 
on his motion had he supported the motion with some evidentiary 
evidence that there was no malice: 
In Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., supra, the 
the court held that because neither pleadings 
nor affidavit raised any issue of malice, the 
court properly granted a motion for summary 
judgment on the libel claim. The court stated: 
If [appellant] Mr. Van Woerden had placed 
in issue the question of [respondent] 
Cudahy's good faith, then Cudahy, as the 
moving party, would have been required to 
support its motion by some evidentiary 
material beyond its pleadings. 
Id. 22 Wash.App. at 282, 588 P.2d at 1225. 
In the case before us, the allegation in 
plaintiff's complaint of malice required the 
defendant to have supported his motion by some 
evidentiary material that there was no malice. 
The record shows that defendant made no effort 
in that regard. Therefore, the plaintiff's 
allegation of malice stood unchallenged and the 
granting of the motion for summary judgment on 
that issue was error. 
Had defendant presented some evidentiary mate-
rial refuting any malice on his part, and had 
the plaintiffs failed to respond to it, the 
trial court could have ruled that there was 
no genuine issue of fact on the question of 
whether the publication was made without malice. 
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, plaintiffs have failed to support 
their claim of malice with any direct evidence of defendants' 
alleged ill-will or reckless disregard. The affidavits submitted 
by defendants, on the other hand, clearly establish that defendants 
did not act with the requisite malice so as to vitiate the common 
interest privilege. As a result, defendants' alleged statements 
were not actionable as a matter of law, and the trial court 
committed no error in dismissing plaintiffs' defamation claim. 
B. The Allegedly Defamatory Statements Attributed to 
Defendants Constituted Mere Opinion. 
The common law rule that an expression of opinion may be 
the basis of an action for defamation was severely criticized in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 339 (1974). In Gertz, the 
plaintiff, an attorney who represented the family of a murder 
victim, brought suit against the defendant publisher. After a 
police officer had been convicted of the murder, defendant pub-
lished an article alleging that the trial was part of a Communist 
conspiracy to discredit the local police, and falsely stated that 
plaintiff had helped "frame" the police officer who had been 
convicted of the murder. The article also implied that plaintiff 
had a criminal record, and labeled him a "Communist-fronter." 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The trial 
court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant. 
The court of appeals affirmed. 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded the case for a new trial. In reaching its decision, 
the court noted: 
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing 
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion 
may seem, we depend for its correction not on 
the conscious of judges and juries but on the 
competition of other ideas. But there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact. 
Id. at 339. 
The principle that expressions of opinion should gener-
ally not form the basis for defamation actions is founded upon 
sound public policy. First, unlike statements of fact, expres-
sions of opinion cannot be established to be true or false. 
Second, uninhibited and wide open discussion of opinion on a vari-
ety of issues is to be encouraged. As a result, statements of 
opinion should not held to be actionable except under very limited 
circumstances, none of which apply in this case. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §566 (1977). See also, Oilman v. Evans, 
750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 
(10th Cir. 1983); Friedman v. Boston Broadcasters, Inc., 402 Mass. 
376, 522 N.E.2d 959 (1988); Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 760 
P.2d 57 (Mont. 1988); and Parks v. Steinbrenner, 131 A.D.2d 60, 
520 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1987). Furthermore, the determination of 
whether a statement constitutes opinion or fact may be made by a 
trial court as a matter of law. Van Duyn v. Smith, 173 Ill.App.3d 
523, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (1988); and Gernander v. Winona State Univ., 
428 N.W.2d 473 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988). 
In the instant action, the allegedly defamatory 
statements are properly categorized as opinion. Statements that 
the plaintiffs' prices are too high, that the plaintiffs' work is 
of questionable quality, and that the plaintiffs may have 
unspecified questionable business practices constitutes opinion. 
The trial court correctly held that such statements were not 
actionable as a matter of law. 
C. The Statements Attributed to Defendants Regarding 
Plaintiffs' Dishonesty Are Not Actionable. 
Plaintiffs allege that defendants have defamed them by 
stating to State Farm insureds and claimants that plaintiffs are 
dishonest or "crooks." The record is devoid of any allegation 
that defendants have ever related any specific act of dishonesty 
or criminal offense to plaintiffs. The record likewise lacks any 
specific allegation of special damages sustained by plaintiffs as 
a result of such statements. While one may be defamed by 
slanderous imputations of criminal conduct, the statements relied 
upon by plaintiff failed to establish a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
Under well established principles, general allegations 
of dishonesty or ciminality are not actionable. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§570, 571 (1977). In Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 
678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
statements of criminal conduct or dishonesty must be specific in 
order to be actionable. In Auto West, plaintiff automobile 
dealers and shareholders commenced action against defendant 
seeking an accounting and return of all moneys allegedly taken 
from plaintiff's auto dealership. Defendant counterclaimed for 
defamation. Defendant claimed that plaintiff had told several 
individuals that defendant had "stolen" or "embezzled" company 
funds. The trial court awarded defendant $25,000 in damages for 
defamation, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. 
The alleged defamatory statements in this case consist 
solely of claims that defendants stated that plaintiffs were 
"dishonest" or "crooks." Unlike in Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 
P.2d 286 (Utah 1984), there is no allegation or evidence that the 
defendants in this action charged plaintiffs with any specific 
criminal conduct. While a statement charging another with spe-
cific criminal conduct is defamation per se, the alleged state-
ments by defendants in this action fall far short of imputing 
criminal conduct to the plaintiffs. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Prince v. Petersen, 5 38 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975), recognized that general statements about one 
being a "crook" may not be actionable. In Prince, defendant 
allegedly told several individuals who were looking to purchase 
plaintiff's family business that plaintiff was a "clever crook" 
and was "stealing from his own children." Plaintiff brought suit 
against defendants for defamation. The jury returned a verdict 
for plaintiff. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
award for defamation. The court refused, however, to find that 
the word "crook" was defamatory per se. Id_. at 1327-28. 
Several courts have summarily disposed of defamation 
claims based upon allegedly slanderous statements involving the 
word "crook." In Cinquanta v. Burdett, 154 Colo. 37, 388 P.2d 779 
(1963), the Colorado Supreme Court found no error in a trial 
court's holding that the word "crook" did not constitute slander 
per se. In Cinquanta, the plaintiff brought a defamation action 
against the defendant after the defendant allegedly defamed him 
stating: "I don't like doing business with crooks. You're a 
deadbeat. You've owed me $155 for three or four months. You're 
crooks." The statements were made in the plaintiff's restaurant 
during the course of an argument. The trial court dismissed the 
action and plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal of the plaintiff's claim of defamation, by stating: 
[W]e must determine whether the words spoken 
by the defendant were such as to either impute 
a crime to the plaintiff or to affect his credit 
and financial reputation by imputing financial 
difficulty or dishonesty for in such cases the 
law in Colorado permits recovery for slander 
without proof of special damages. 
We must first consider whether the words "crook" 
or "crooks" impute a crime or a criminal offense 
to the plaintiff. In determining this question 
we cannot isolate the offending words from their 
context and we must examine the words in light 
of the total attendant circumstances. 
To come within the exception permitting recovery 
in an action for slander without proof of special 
damage because the words spoken impute a crime, 
it is the general rule that such words must 
impute conduct constituting a criminal offense 
chargeable by indictment or by information 
either at common law or by statute and of such 
kind as to involve infamous punishment or moral 
turpitude conveying the idea of major social 
disgrace. Mere words of abuse spoken in out-
bursts of excitement or passion do not con-
stitute slander per se. The fact that the 
language is offensive to the plaintiff does 
not in itself make the words used slander 
per se. It is true that the word "crook" is 
derogatory, but the word does not in and of 
itself impute the commission of a crime. In 
view of the popular use of the word "crook" 
in common language to denote conduct with which 
the speaker is displeased and with so many 
dictionary definitions of the word which refer 
to matters not chargeable as a crime, it is 
clear to us that the naked use of the word 
"crook" does not constitute slander per se. 
Cinquanta, 388 P.2d at 780 (emphasis added). 
In Cummings v. Kirby, 216 Neb. 314, 343 N.W.2d 747 
(1984), the plaintiff brought suit against his mother's attorney 
based on the attorney's statement to the plaintiff's mother that 
everyone in the county knew that her son was a "crook." The 
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court stated: 
Cummings' cause of action is legally deficient 
on another ground. The petition in this matter 
alleged that Kirby stated that others referred 
to Cummings as a "crook." The court has stated 
that the "crook" is a word of general abuse, 
and while derogatory and disparaging, does not 
constitute a basis for recovery of damages in 
the absence of a specific allegation of special 
damages. 
Cummings, 343 N.W.2d at 749. 
Likewise, the court in Ceravola v. Brown, 364 So.2d 1155 
(Ala. 1978), sustained the entry of summary judgment for a 
defendant on a claim that the defendant had slandered the 
plaintiff in public by calling him a "deadbeat" and a "crook." 
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged as follows: 
The defendant, Norman K. Brown, has on 
numerous occasions, and before people, 
threatened the plaintiff with arrest and 
criminal prosecution, and did have others 
call and threaten the same. Defendant has 
called plaintiff a deadbeat and a crook, 
and has threatened before a large group of 
people to drive the plaintiff crazy. 
Defendant has by his numerous malicious 
actions against this plaintiff, including 
his use of abusive, insulting and offensive 
language and use of ethnic slurs against 
the plaintiff, attempted to slander and 
libel the plaintiff and to ruin his repu-
tation and indeed drive him crazy. 
Plaintiff will show unto this honorable 
court that as a direct result of the 
defendant's actions, his reputation has 
been irreparably damaged, he has been 
ruined in the business community, and his 
credit standing has been diminished. 
On appeal, the Alabama court noted that the plaintiff 
had failed to allege any special damages. In addition, the court 
noted that to constitute slander per se, the statement must 
impute an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude. 
As a result, the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant, by stating: 
While it may be odious to berate someone in 
public with threats and ethnic slurs and to 
attack someone with epitaphs such as "deadbeat" 
and "crook," such questionable behavior is, 
nevertheless, not actionable in Alabama absent 
allegations of special damages. Even under our 
liberalized rules of procedure, Rule 9(g) A.R.C.P. 
still requires special damages to be specifically 
stated, and without them, Ceravolo's complaint 
does not state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
Id. at 1157. See also, Klein v. McGauley, A.D.2d 418, 288 
N.Y.S.2d 751, 755 (1968) ("Standing alone, the word "crook" is 
no doubt defamatory and actionable per se when written, but it 
cannot be said to charge an indictable crime involving moral 
turpitude or infamous punishment, an element necessary to a 
finding of slander per se, without further refinement or refer-
ence to a specific act . . . . [T]he word "crook" is not com-
monly understood today as imputing an indictable crime. Rather, 
it is a term used frequently as a simple expression of opprobrium 
and applied to persons not guilty of any crime. However abusive, 
it has been bandied about to such an extent that its sting has 
been greatly reduced.") 
The trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor 
of defendants on plaintiffs' claim of defamation based on state-
ments that plaintiffs are "crooks" is further supported by the 
affidavits submitted by defendants in support of defendants' 
motion. The undisputed evidence is that plaintiffs have at times 
engaged in questionable business practices. The record 
establishes that plaintiffs frequently deviate from estimates by 
failing to use new parts or make directed repairs, without 
notifying State Farm or reimbursing State Farm for parts not used 
or repairs not made. State Farm's knowledge of such questionable 
practices has come about solely as a result of State Farm's pol-
icy to reinspect vehicles repaired by plaintiffs and other auto-
mobile body shops. The fact that State Farm has paid plaintiffs 
for requested services which were never rendered clearly 
establishes that the claim that plaintiffs are "dishonest" or 
"crooks" is substantially true. As such, truth is an absolute 
defense to plaintiffs' defamation action. Auto West, 678 P.2d at 
290. 
Defendants' alleged statements that plaintiffs are 
"dishonest" or "crooks" do not constitute slander per se. No 
specific acts of dishonesty or criminal offense were ever 
attributed to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further failed to produce 
any evidence of any specific special damages sustained by them as 
a result of defendants' statements. As a result, plaintiffs' 
cause of action for defamation fails as a matter of law. 
D. Defendants' Allegedly Defamatory Statements Were True. 
Under well established Utah law, truth is an absolute 
defense in a defamation action. Auto West, 678 P.2d at 290. The 
trial court correctly ruled that the alleged statements made by 
defendants were not actionable since defendants demonstrated that 
the alleged statements were substantially true. At the trial 
level, defendants submitted unrefutted evidence establishing the 
following facts and good faith opinions: 
1. Plaintiffs' repair work often deviates from the 
repair estimates written by defendants and accepted 
by plaintiffs themselves, including plaintiffs' use 
of used or repaired parts in place of new parts as 
called for in the repair estimates issued by 
defendants. R. 35-44, 96-99, 107-110. 
2. Plaintiffs' own employees have admitted that they 
seek to obtain additional sums from defendant State 
Farm beyond that actually expended or required on 
a particular repair estimate. R. 35-39, 96-99. 
3. Plaintiffs' unusual and unreasonable charges for 
towing, storage, and deposit fees. R. 32-39, 
103-06. 
4. Plaintiffs' labor rates for body work are higher than 
the prevailing competitive rate in Salt Lake County. 
R. 35-44, 96-99, 103-06. 
5. Plaintiffs' own statements that they attempt to hide 
disputed charges in billings to insurance companies. 
R. 103-06. 
6. Plaintiffs' repair work is comparable or inferior 
to repair work performed by other automobile 
repair shops in Salt Lake County. R. 35-39, 
103-110. 
The evidence before the trial court established that the state-
ments allegedly made by defendants regarding plaintiffs' 
dishonesty were substantiated in truth and fact. As such, the 
trial court correctly ruled that the alleged statements were not 
actionable as a matter of law. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
Plaintiffs on appeal assert that the trial court erred 
in dismissing their claim that defendants tortiously interfered 
with plaintiffs' prospective business relations. The tort of 
tortious interference with economic relations was recognized in 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
In Leigh Furniture, plaintiff sold a furniture business in St. 
George, Utah to defendant on contract in 1970. In 1975, 
plaintiff brought action against defendant to repossess the 
business, terminate his interest under the contract, and obtain a 
deficiency judgment. Defendant denied being in default under the 
agreement, and counterclaimed for damages caused when plaintiff 
allegedly forced defendant out of business and into bankruptcy. 
The jury found for defendant in all respects, and awarded damages 
on defendants' counterclaim. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations, 
finding that the plaintiff's verbal abuse of the defendant and 
plaintiff's over zealous attempts to protect his contract 
interests crossed the threshold of tortious conduct. Before 
recognizing such a cause of action, the court reviewed various 
tests or standards for the prima facie tort of interference with 
prospective economic relations. In rejecting the approach 
offered by the authors of the Restatement of Torts, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the definition of the tort of interference 
with prospective economic relations given by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 
Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978): 
We recognize a common-law cause of action for 
intentional interference with prospective 
business relations, and adopt the Oregon 
definition of this tort. Under this defini-
tion, in order to recover damages, the plaintiff 
must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury 
to the plaintiff. Privilege is an affirmative 
defense, Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682 
(1982), which does not become an issue unless 
"the acts charged would be tortious on the part 
of an unprivileged defendant." Top Service Body 
Shop, Inc., 283 Or. at 210, 582 P.2d at 1371. 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304. 
In Top Service Body Shop, the Oregon court was faced 
with a situation similar to that presented here. The plaintiff 
automobile body repair shop sued defendant insurance company for 
damages allegedly resulting from defendant's practice of 
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directing insurance claimants to have repairs made at other body 
shops. Plaintiff1s complaint included a claim of tortious inter-
ference with plaintiff's business. Defendant Allstate denied the 
allegations and raised an affirmative defense asserting that its 
actions were privileged. A jury verdict in excess of $300,000 
was returned in favor of plaintiff. On Allstatefs motion, the 
trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial court had 
erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
claim of tortious interference. Plaintiff had alleged both 
improper motives and improper means of interference on the part 
of Allstate. Plaintiff alleged that Allstate induced plaintiff's 
patrons not to have plaintiff repair their automobiles by making 
false statements about the quality of plaintiff's work, and 
threatening to withdraw insurance coverage. However, there was 
no direct evidence of any specific purpose on the part of 
Allstate to destroy plaintiff's business. The Oregon Supreme 
Court noted that while such an intent could have been inferred 
from Allstate's conduct in directing customers to other body 
repair shops, "the record will not support an inference that 
Allstate had any design or purpose to inflict injury on Top 
Service as such, even short of the 'sole design' to put Top 
Service out of business that the complaint alleges." Id. at 
1372. 
The Oregon court, in reviewing the evidence at trial, 
stated: 
[T]he evidence showed that Allstate has a 
practice of designating certain repair shops 
in the locality as "competitor shops" to 
which it prefers to send insurance claimants 
for whose repairs Allstate is obligated; that 
Top Service at one time was a "drive-in" shop 
for Allstate, where claimants would be directed 
for an estimate by an Allstate insurance 
adjuster; that after a dispute Top Service's 
owner decided that it would not continue as a 
drive-in shop for Allstate; and that thereafter 
Allstate adjusters would actually discourage 
claimants under its insurance policies from 
taking work to be paid for by Allstate to Top 
Service, sending them instead to other shops 
on its preferred list. As specific bases for 
an inference of destructive purpose, Top 
Service listed two occasions when Allstate 
adjusters disparaged the quality of Top 
Service's work (apart from its relative cost), 
although Allstate's personnel had generally 
considered Top Service a high quality shop; 
Allstate's willingness to disappoint its own 
insured who preferred Top Service; one occasion 
when Allstate took its option to "total" a car, 
i.e. to pay off its value, when the insured 
wanted it repaired at Top Service; and finally 
All state's resort to "improper and unlawful 
means" to direct business away from Top Service 
to other shops. 
Id. at 1372. 
In affirming the trial court's entry of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the tortious interference claim, 
the Oregon court stated: 
[W]e agree with the trial court that these 
acts were wholly consistent with Allstate's 
pursuit of its own business purposes as it 
saw them and did not suffice to support an 
inference of the alleged improper purpose 
to injure Top Service. The court's ruling 
on this point was not error. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Since the Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement in Leigh 
Furniture, the Utah Court of Appeals in Sampson v. Richins, 770 
P.2d 998 (Ut.Ct.App. 1989), explored the requirements for claimi 
intentional interference with economic relations, by stating: 
In order to establish "improper purpose" 
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defen-
dant's interference is maliciously motivated, 
"'in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm 
to the plaintiff for its own sake . . . . ' " 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307 (quoting W. 
Prosser, Handbook of Law of Torts §129 at 943 
(4th ed. 1971)). In a case of mixed motives, 
a court must determine the defendant's pre-
dominant purpose underlying his conduct. Id. 
"Problems inherent in proving motivation or 
purpose make it prudent for commercial conduct 
to be regulated for the most part by the 
improper means alternative, which typically 
requires only a showing of particular conduct." 
Id. 
The improper means element "is satisfied where 
the means used to interfere with a party's 
economic relations are contrary to law, such 
as violations of statutes, regulations, or 
recognized common-law rules. Such acts are 
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence 
are clearly 'improper' means of interference." 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308 (citations 
omitted). 
IdL at 1003. 
Plaintiffs in this case seek reversal of the entry of 
summary judgment on their claim for tortious interference with 
prospective business relations by claiming that they produced 
evidence that defendants improperly interfered with their 
customers. Plaintiffs also claim support in the record for thei 
allegation that defendants have engaged in such conduct for an 
improper purpose through various improper means, including 
"threats, intimidation, misrepresentation, defamation and 
disparaging falsehoods." (Plaintiffs' Brief at 14) 
Despite plaintiffs' assertion that defendants' actions 
are geared to drive them out of business, the record is devoid of 
any evidence to support such a proposition. Though the relation-
ship between plaintiffs and defendants has often been acrimonious 
and hostile, the undisputed evidence is that State Farm continues 
to permit its insureds and claimants to have their automobiles 
repaired by plaintiffs. Plaintiff Bryan Christensen testified 
that his company performed nearly 100 repairs for State Farm 
insureds in 1987, the last year for which he had any figures. 
R. 238 at pp. 199-205. While plaintiffs' work for State Farm 
has decreased over the last several years, the apparent void left 
by State Farm was filled by repair work for other insurers, 
including Allstate Insurance. _id. In addition, plaintiffs' 
gross receipts have increased from approximately $536,000 in 1980 
to more than $820,000 in 1987. id. If defendants' actions were 
intended to drive plaintiffs out of business, such efforts failed 
to have the "desired" effect. 
State Farm introduced unrefuted evidence to the trial 
court that the decline in plaintiffs' work for State Farm 
corresponded to a significant down-turn in the total number of 
claims handled by State Farm in Utah. In 1985, State Farm 
reported 69,685 claims, in 1986 66,247 claims, and in 1987 65,847 
claims. R. 213-15. The "downturn" in business complained of by 
plaintiffs has been greatly impacted by the fact that State Farm 
has had fewer claims in the past few years. With fewer available 
opportunities to work on State Farm claims, the decline in plain-
tiffs' work for State Farm is more the result of mild winters than 
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State Farm's desire to drive plaintiffs out of business. IcL 
In the event that State Farm truly wanted to put 
plaintiffs out of business, State Farm could surely avail itself 
of its legal right to entirely direct State Farm insureds away 
from plaintiffs' business. The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently held that an individual or entity may unilaterally 
refuse to deal with whomever it pleases. United States v. 
Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See also, McKenzie v. 
Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988); Buy-Rite Dist., 
Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 577 F.Supp. 530 (D. Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, courts have generally recognized the right of a 
party to refuse to deal with whomever it chooses based upon a 
desire to avoid hostility and potential litigation. Zoslow v. 
RCA Dist. Corp., 693 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982). 
The propriety of State Farm's motives and actions is 
supported by a substantial number of cases which have consistently 
found no federal or state anti-trust violations in insurance com-
panies making market surveys, determining "prevailing labor 
rates" and directing their insureds/claimants to shops which will 
readily accept the insurer's repair estimates. In Chick's Auto 
Body v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J.Super. 68, 401 
A. 2d 722 (1979), the plaintiff auto body shops brought suit 
against various automobile insurance companies on claims of state 
anti-trust violations. After extensive discovery, the New Jersey 
court granted the insurance company's motions for summary 
judgment, holding that the insurer's activities did not violate 
state anti-trust laws. Chick's Auto Body, 401 A.2d at 729-31. 
The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants had 
engaged in improper conduct by stating: 
The first count of the complaint charges 
defendants with "fixing prices." The "prices" 
referred to by plaintiffs are the amounts paid 
by the carriers to their insured and the alleged 
"price-fixing" referred to is the carrier's 
refusal to pay more than the prevailing service 
rates. 
In effect, plaintiffs' price-fixing allegation 
seeks to force defendants to pay them a price 
higher than the present prevailing service rate 
($14.00) accepted by other body shops in the 
competitive area. Under the guise of a "price-
fixing" claim, plaintiffs seek not to further 
price competition, but to avoid it. In effect, 
plaintiffs assert that they should not have to 
compete with other shops on price. They contend, 
instead, that defendants should be required to 
pay their insureds whatever price plaintiffs 
decide to charge them. 
* * * 
What plaintiffs describe as price-fixing is, in 
fact, no more than a natural consumer-oriented 
competitive activity in getting the lowest com-
petitive price. 
The Chick's Auto Body court also rejected the plaintiffs' 
claim that the defendants had engaged in an illegal boycott: 
The second count alleges a "boycott" on the 
part of defendants. Plaintiffs make frequent 
use of the term "leveraged shops." As explained 
by one plaintiff, "leveraged shops" are those 
included on each carriers list of those body 
shops that can be expected to perform repairs 
within the particular carrier's estimate. There 
is no contention that anyone willing to work at 
competitive rates has been excluded from any 
list. 
Plaintiffs do work for insureds of all defen-
dants; plaintiffs are free to do the work for 
the defendants' insureds at the estimates written 
by defendants or to turn the business away; 
plaintiffs are free to charge and collect from 
the defendants' insureds any part of the repair 
price which exceeds the insurance reimbursement, 
and plaintiffs' allegation that they are "denied" 
repair work is only that they have in certain 
instances declined jobs because defendant insur-
ance companies' estimate was below plaintiffs' 
and the insured did not wish to pay the differ-
ence out of his own pocket. 
* * * 
In trying to obtain the lowest available prices 
defendants are doing no more than conducting 
their business as any rational enterprise would* 
An unlawful boycott would not result from a 
buyer's refusal to pay a higher price for goods 
or services where it can buy them at a lower 
price. 
* * * 
In addition, plaintiffs must, of course, 
establish that any alleged "boycott" and 
restraint of trade is the product of some 
contract, combination or conspiracy--!.e., a 
concerted refusal to deal. Plaintiffs do not 
point to any facts which indicate or suggest 
that defendants had some agreement with res-
pect to their dealing with plaintiffs, or that 
they had conspired or acted in concert on this 
subject. 
Id. at 730-31 (citations omitted). 
Likewise, similar claims were rejected in De Bonaventura 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 419 A.2d 942 (Del.Ch. 1980), aff'd, 
428 A.2d 1151 (Del. 1981). Plaintiffs, six automobile body 
repair shops, sought a permanent injunction to require Nationwide 
Insurance to increase its damage appraisals. Plaintiffs alleged 
that Nationwide had improperly influenced its insureds to use 
certain "preferred" repair shops and to refrain from using 
plaintiffs' shops. Plaintiffs also asserted that the insurer had 
engaged in acts of conspiracy in violation of state anti-trust 
law, had defamed plaintiffs, and had tortiously interfered with 
the plaintiffs' business relationships. Nationwide denied the 
allegations and affirmatively asserted that it acted properly in 
serving its own economic self-interests, as well as those of its 
insureds. 
The trial court noted that the basic issue to be answered 
was whether Nationwide "may channel or direct automobile owners 
with whom it deals to its preferred shops." De Bonaventura, 419 
A.2d at 946. The trial court sustained the insurer's right to 
channel its insureds away from plaintiffs' shops, and refused to 
grant the requested injunctive relief, by stating: 
I conclude after trial that the crux of 
plaintiffs' grievance is to be found not in 
any contrived theory of improper economic 
coercion allegedly exercised against plaintiffs 
by defendant but in the economic reality that 
most car owners with valid claims against the 
present defendant have decided that the quality 
of the workmanship and materials available at 
plaintiffs' shops is not sufficiently superior 
to that furnished at the competitive or preferred 
shops recommended by defendant to its insureds 
and claimants to warrant the paying of money 
out of one's own pocket to make up the difference 
between plaintiff's prices and those offered by 
those shops which quote more competitive prices 
* * * 
The answer to the question of whether or not to 
grant or refuse injunctive relief is often found 
in the practical aspects of a situation such as 
that presented in the litigation at hand. In 
the case at bar, the contracting parties, insofar 
as rights arising out of the issuance of insurance 
policies here in issue are concerned, are the 
insureds on the one hand and Nationwide on the 
other. If an insured or claimant in the course 
of the settlement of any damage claim covered by 
insurance issued by Nationwide is satisfied with 
the latter's estimate of the amount of the 
reasonable cost to repair a damaged vehicle and 
thereafter accepts Nationwidefs choice of a 
repair shop to perform such needed repairs, there 
would appear to be no basis for granting plaintiffs 
the type of permanent injunctive relief which they 
pray for here, plaintiffs' grievance being 
attributable to the simple fact that their 
prices are too high and non-competitive to 
enable them to bid successfully for the work 
involved in repairing damaged motor vehicles 
insured by Nationwide. 
Id. at 950-51. The Delaware Supreme Court found no error in the 
opinion of the trial court, and affirmed. De Bonaventura, 428 
A.2d at 1154. 
In Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 
1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982), the 
plaintiff auto body shop brought suit against defendants, 
Allstate and State Farm, for violation of federal anti-trust 
laws. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants' claims-handling 
procedures illegally fixed the price of automobile repairs and 
resulted in a boycott of plaintiff's business. Defendants 
successfully moved for summary judgment. On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no anti-trust 
violation. Id. at 1200-01. 
The Quality Auto Body court also sustained the legality 
of the vertical arrangements between the defendant insurance com-
panies and certain "preferred" auto repair shops. Id. at 
1203-04. The Quality Auto Body court also disposed of the 
plaintiff's boycott claim by stating: 
The gravamen of Quality's complaint does not 
appear to be defendant's refusal to deal but 
rather defendant's refusal to pay more than the 
prevailing competitive price for labor and new 
parts. Although some repair shops which charge 
more than the so-called prevailing competitive 
rate may suffer some economic losses, these losses 
appear basically to be the result of the shops' 
inability or unwillingness to meet competition. 
The Darwinian workings of competition (which the 
anti-trust laws are presumably designed to foster) 
mean that high-cost, high-price shops tend to 
lose business and might even go out of business 
if they cannot become more competitive . . . . 
Whatever sympathy one may feel for the body 
shops in these circumstances, the anti-trust 
laws were not intended to provide redress for 
losses resulting from non-competitive prices. 
In any event, even if there were evidence that 
either or both defendants refused to deal with 
Quality, this conduct would not constitute an 
illegal boycott without proof of concerted action. 
Id. at 1206. See also Workman v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 520 F.Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Proctor v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., [1980-81] Trade Cases 
(CCH) §63,591 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 308 (1982). 
The Utah Insurance Department Regulations likewise 
specifically empower insurers to designate specific repair shops 
for automobile repairs so long as the repairs restore the vehicle 
to its pre-accident condition "at no additional cost to the 
claimant other than stated in the policy and within a reasonable 
period of time." Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulation, 
Utah Insurance Department Regulation R540-89-11(H). 
In this case, plaintiffs at the trial court level failed 
to produce any evidence that defendants acted with an improper 
purpose. Indeed, the only evidence before the trial court was 
that State Farm's actions were for the proper purpose of promot-
ing and protecting its own financial interests, as well as those 
of its insureds. As a result, plaintiffs may not prevail on 
appeal unless they can demonstrate evidence that defendants acted 
through improper means. At the trial level, plaintiffs rested 
their "improper means" allegation on defendants' alleged viola-
tions of the Utah Anti-Trust Act and defamation. Plaintiffs have 
abandoned their anti-trust claim on appeal. As discussed supra, 
plaintiffs' claim of defamation also fails as a matter of law. 
Absent any evidence of improper purpose or improper means, the 
trial court cannot be said to have acted incorrectly in 
dismissing plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference with pro-
spective business relationships. This Court should, therefore, 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully 
request that this court affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
DATED this /Z~ day of ^ , 1990. 
STRONG 6c HANNI 
ranm 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this j2- - day of JtJy'* 
1990, four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT were mailed postage prepaid, to: 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE 6c ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§45-2-3. Privileged publication of broadcast defined. 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not 
be considered as libelous or slanderous per se, is one made: 
(3) In a communication, without malice, to a 
person interested therein, by one who is also inter-
ested, or by one who stands in such relation to the 
person interested as to afford a reasonable ground 
for supposing the motive for the communication 
innocent, or who is requested by the person interested 
to give the information. 
§45-2-4. Malice not inferred from publication. 
In the cases provided for in Subsections (3), (4) and 
(5) of the preceding section, malice is not inferred from 
the communication or publication. 
§76-9-506. Privilege as to communications between 
interested persons• 
A communication made to a person interested in the communi-
cation by one who is also interested, or who stands in a 
relation to the former as to afford a reasonable ground for 
supposing his motive innocent, is not presumed to be 
malicious, and is a privileged communication. 
UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REGULATION 
R540-89-11. Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable 
Settlements Applicable to Automobile Insurance. 
* * * 
H. When the insurer elects to repair and designates 
a specific repair shop for automobile repairs, the insurer 
shall cause the damaged automobile to be restored to its 
condition prior to the loss at no additional cost to the 
claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a 
reasonable period of time. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs.
 ; 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, ) 
Defendants. ) 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
) G. LAVAN WALKER 
Civil NO. C87-7726 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, G. LAVAN WALKER, having been duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has worked as an estimator for defendant 
State Farm for approximately 22 years. 
2. During the course of his employment, affiant has 
rendered thousands of property damage estimates for State Farm 
insureds and claimants. 
3. Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on a day-to-day 
S21 A3. 
basis since the day plaintiffs' business was established. 
4. Affiant has found plaintiffs to be among the most 
difficult individuals and repair shops to deal with over the 
course of his 22-year career with State Farm. 
5. Affiant has handled hundreds of claims estimates 
which have been serviced by plaintiffs. 
6. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
verbally abuse and deride affiant's employer, State Farm, and 
affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell. 
7. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," that State Farm is 
trying to "cut plaintiffs* business down," and that State Farm is 
"not qualified to tell plaintiffs how to run their business." 
8. On numerous occasions, affiant has reinspected 
automobiles repaired by plaintiffs and observed that the repairs 
performed by plaintiffs deviated from the repair estimates sub-
mitted to and accepted by plaintiffs. 
9. Based upon affiant's experience in the automobile 
body repair field, affiant * ^  o£— l hm M^ irrtrrn t-h*f of K^r—?m4^MTm-
birJre-body repair l^iupj in ^jll Lake CuuiiLy ao superior mrrkr than 
plaintiffs', and that plaintiffs have on occasion submitted exces-
sive and unreasonable towing and storage fees. 
S21 A4 
DATED this /y day of ^/^T?J^ , 1988. 
(X. LAVAN WALKER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /^?7Aday of 
l\)otf&nnhP.r . 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC O 
Residing a t tSa j - l - Labt^ £oU.n-ly* 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this t(fa day of /]0<e<rt^ , 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
G. LaVan Walker was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
S21-AFFID511/8/88nh 
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARSHALL K. WELCH 
Civil No. C87-7726 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, MARSHALL K. WELCH, having been duly sworn, 
hereby deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has been an employee of defendant State 
Farm since December, 1985. 
2. Affiant is currently employed as a claims supervisor 
and is responsible for supervising various claims estimators. 
Prior to serving as claims supervisor, affiant was employed as a 
property damage estimator for State Farm. 
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3. Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on at least 35-50 
occasions since becoming employed by State Farm, 
4. Affiant has handled hundreds of claims with other 
automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. Based upon affiant's experience, it is affiant's 
opinion that plaintiffs and plaintiffs' employees are inordinately 
difficult to work with. 
6. During affiant's dealings with plaintiffs, affiant 
has been subjected to plaintiffs' verbal abuse and derision of 
affiant's employer, State Farm, and affiant's supervisor, Leon 
Maxwell. 
7. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," that Mr. Maxwell 
"has it in" for plaintiffs' shop, that Mr. Maxwell "is dictating 
plaintiffs' prices" and that Mr. Maxwell is "trying to control" 
the automobile body repair industry in Salt Lake County. 
8. On numerous occasions, affiant has heard plaintiffs 
subject other State Farm employees to verbal abuse and derision. 
9. Affiant has heard plaintiffs say, in effect, that 
if State Farm refuses to pay additional amounts for certain 
supplemental repairs, that plaintiffs "would get it elsewhere" on 
another repair item or repair job for State Farm. 
10. Affiant has observed that plaintiffs' towing, 
storing and deposit fees are often unusual and unreasonable based 
S21 A7 
upon affiant's experience with the automobile body repair 
industry in Salt Lake County. 
11. Affiant has observed that plaintiffs' continually 
find affiant's and other State Farm estimators' repair estimates 
to be "unacceptable" and have required an unusually high number 
and percentage of supplemental repair estimates. 
12. As a result of plaintiffs' refusal to find State 
Farm's estimates to be acceptable, affiant and State Farm have 
been required to use a system of "competitive bids" when dealing 
with plaintiffs' shop. 
13. Under the present system of "competitive bids," 
State Farm has its insureds and claimants obtain two or three 
bids from plaintiffs' competitors in order to set the reasonable 
cost of repair. 
14. Under such a policy of "competitive bids," it is 
frequently necessary for State Farm's insureds and claimants to 
have plaintiffs' competitors enter onto plaintiffs' premises to 
obtain their estimates. 
15. That plaintiffs for several months have refused to 
permit their competitors onto plaintiffs' premises to obtain 
"competitive bids." 
16. Due to plaintiffs' refusal to permit their 
competitors onto their premises, State Farm, its insureds and 
claimants have been required to have vehicles towed from 
S21 A8 
plaintiffs' premises to other locations in order to obtain 
competitive bids, all of which results in significant additional 
time being spent and expense incurred. 
17. Plaintiffs have required a nonrefundable "deposit 
fee" for certain vehicles towed from its premises to another shop 
for the purpose of obtaining competitive bids. This has resulted 
in significant inconvenience and expense to affiant, State Farm, 
and State Farm's insureds and claimants. 
18. Since early 1988, affiant has served as a 
reinspector for State Farm. 
19. As a reinspector, affiant is required to randomly 
check automobiles following their repair by automobile body 
repair shops, including plaintiffs' shop, in Salt Lake County, 
20. Affiant has reinspected in excess of 300 
automobiles. 
21. Affiant has reinspected at least 10 vehicles 
repaired at plaintiffs' shop. 
22. On several occasions, affiant has noticed signifi-
cant deviations between the repairs called for in the repair 
estimates and the actual repairs performed by plaintiffs. 
23. That based upon affiant's experience with other 
automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, it is affiant's 
opinion that there are other shops that do better work than 
plaintiffs' shop and that plaintiffs' prices for repairs are 
S21
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generally higher than the prevailing competitive price charged 
by other repair shops in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
DATED this / T day of X^d^gV^^^ , 1988. 
v^>-r/ f£ MARSHALL K " WELCH 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /S^/i^ay of 
hi r>^ ember 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC O ~ 
Residing at:;S?/-A Lc^hsi Cou^-hs 
My Commission Expires 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ~W^_ day of/k^^L, 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Marshall K. Welch was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall w. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, , 
Defendants. 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) LEON MAXWELL 
I Civil No. C87-7726 
) Honorable James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, LEON MAXWELL, having been duly sworn, hereby 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has worked for defendant State Farm for 
approximately 16 years. 
2. Affiant has served as property claims superintendent 
in the State of Utah for State Farm for approximately the last 
five years. 
3. Affiant has had almost day-to-day contact with 
S21 
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plaintiffs and plaintiffs' employees since 1981. 
4. Affiant is directly responsible for providing 
proper and timely service to State Farm's insureds and claimants. 
5. Affiant is responsible for the supervision and 
training of State Farm's estimators and reinspectors and other 
individuals, as designated by his supervisors. 
6. As part of affiant's duties to State Farm, affiant 
regularly conducts price surveys of automobile repair shops to 
establish the prevailing competitive rate for parts, labor, 
towing, paint and materials-
7. Affiant and State Farm do not share or otherwise 
disclose the results of such price surveys to anyone outside of 
State Farm. 
8. Affiant conducts such price surveys in order to 
protect and promote State Farm's economic interests, as well as 
the economic interests of State Farm's insureds. 
9. Affiant conducts such price surveys in order to 
secure the highest quality and most economical services available 
for State Farm insureds and claimants. 
10. The amounts expended by State Farm to repair its 
insureds' and claimants' vehicles is a critical factor in the 
setting of automobile liability insurance rates in the State of 
Utah. 
11. Based upon such price surveys and affiant's experi-
S21 A12 
ence with plaintiffs, affiant is aware that plaintiffs often 
charge more for their services than their competitors, and often 
charge more than the prevailing competitive rate. 
12. Affiant has experienced more difficulties in 
dealing with plaintiffs that with most other automobile body 
shops in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
13. During the past several years, affiant has been 
subjected repeatedly to verbal abuse, profanity, and derision by 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs1 employees. 
14. Due to difficulties in dealing with plaintiffs, 
affiant and State Farm implemented a program designed to reach 
a mutually agreeable repair estimate with plaintiffs whereby 
State Farm instructs its insureds and claimants to obtain two or 
three competitive bids from plaintiffs1 competitors. 
15. Plaintiffs have refused and continued to refuse 
access to their facilities to plaintiffs1 competitors in order to 
obtain such competitive bids. 
16. Affiant and other State Farm employees, including 
the estimators and reinspectors under affiant's control and 
supervision, have been greatly inconvenienced by plaintiffs1 
repeated refusals to accept State Farm's estimates, without 
excessive supplemental estimates, and plaintiffs' refusal to per-
mit competitors on their premises to provide competitive bids. 
17. As a result of plaintiffs' conduct, State Farm's 
S21 A13 
employees have been required to spend substantially more time and 
expense in servicing claims handled by plaintiffs than by other 
automobile body shops in Salt Lake County. 
18- Affiant has on several occasions reinspected auto-
mobiles repaired by plaintiffs and observed that the repairs per-
formed by plaintiffs deviated from the repair estimates submitted 
to and accepted by plaintiffs. 
DATED this 15 ~ day of ^ V - K ^ . ^ ^ U , 1988. 
LEON MAXWELL 
^z,A^J{ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / O y v day of 
November 1988. 
NOTARY PCIRF.TP <5 
T 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 ( 
Residing a t : ^ o i ^ c I A X J L - C & U - K H 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this / ^ day of/^^M , 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leon 
S21 A14 
Maxwell was mailed, postage prepaid, to; 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
S21-AFFID711/14/88nh 
S21 A15 
GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG 6. HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE j 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, , 
Defendants. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) TED H. FISH 
Civil No. C87-7726 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, TED H. FISH, having been duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has been an employee of defendant State 
Farm for approximately two years. 
2. Affiant served as a property damage estimator at the 
State Farm Sandy Branch Office from January, 1987 until December, 
1987. 
3- Affiant knows of at least 30-40 repair estimates 
J UX . 
- 1 r\ 
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prepared by him which ultimately were serviced by plaintiffs' 
shop. As a result, affiant was required on numerous occasions to 
visit plaintiffs' facility. 
4. Affiant on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs sub-
ject affiant's employer, State Farm, and plaintiffs1 supervisor, 
Leon Maxwell, to verbal abuse and derision. 
5. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," and that Mr. Maxwell 
is a "bastard." 
6. Affiant has on numerous occasions requested that 
plaintiffs cease from making verbal comments about his employer 
and supervisors, but plaintiffs continue to make such remarks in 
affiant's presence. 
7. On at least one occasion, during a dispute 
concerning a repair estimate between affiant and plaintiff, Bryan 
Christensen, affiant heard Mr. Christensen state, in effect, 
"If I don't get it on this job, I'll get it on the next one." 
8. On several occasions, affiant has reinspected 
vehicles repairs by various automobile body repair shops, 
including plaintiffs', in Salt Lake County. 
9. Affiant is of the opinion that plaintiffs do "good" 
work, but frequently deviate from the repair estimate without 
informing affiant or State Farm. 
10. Affiant has found plaintiffs very difficult to work 
S21 A17 
with, and that plaintiffs' business practices resulted in affiant 
spending far more time in handling claims with plaintiffs' shop 
than with other automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County. 
11. On numerous occasions, affiant reviewed the towing, 
storage, and other incidental expenses charged by plaintiffs' 
facility, and is of the opinion that such charges were unusual 
and unreasonable, especially those charges on automobiles which 
were eventually repaired by facilities other than plaintiffs'. 
DATED this /S m day of A/OI'E/MAT/3 1988. 
TED H. FISH 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /OrK^ day of 
NW&mbf.f- . 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC O 
Residing at: "SoJ^ jr L^ -kj? Coi>w<-^Y 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby cer t i fy that on th i s /jfi* day of /favttcfaj , 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Ted H. 
S21 A18 
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Fish was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall w. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE 6. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
S21-AFFID311/8/88nh 
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) JEFFREY FINLEY 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C87-7726 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, ) Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, JEFFREY FINLEY, having been duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has been employed as an estimator for 
defendant State Farm for approximately two and one-half years. 
2. During the course of affiant's employment with 
State Farm, affiant has worked on approximately 24-30 claims with 
plaintiffs. 
3. Affiant has visited plaintiffs' shop in Murray, 
Jp4 % * » 1 '••••'VI jsjp*^. 
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Utah, on numerous occasions. 
4. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
state that affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell, is a "son of a 
bitch" and a "bastard," and that State Farm and Mr. Maxwell are 
attempting to "scare" the automobile body repair shops in the 
Salt Lake Valley into keeping their prices low. 
5. On numerous occasions, affiant has been treated in 
a discourteous manner by plaintiff's son, Jeff Christensen, 
Mr. Christensen has frequently threatened to hold affiant ulti-
mately responsible for the adequacy of repairs made by plaintiffs 
to the vehicles of State Farm's insureds and claimants unless 
State Farm agreed to pay more than the prevailling rate for 
repairs. 
6. On at least one occasion, affiant has been con-
fronted by plaintiff's son, Jeff Christensen, about the pendency 
of the instant action. Mr. Christensen has subjected affiant to 
verbal abuse and derision concerning defendants' and defendants1 
attorneys' actions. 
7. Based upon affiant's experiences with the numerous 
automobile body repair shops in the Salt Lake Valley, affiant 
believes that plaintiffs are among the most difficult to deal with. 
8. Affiant has noted that he spends approximately 
twice as much time in servicing claims handled through plaintiffs1 
shop than with other automobile repair shops in Salt Lake County. 
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DATED this /<?" day of y]/^ ^4^^L-^ 1988 
NLEY 
,-<^t-^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /„ ;/A—day of 
Mwemke.r 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ > 7^  
Residing at:Q>QJb ^ u L LPu^Af 
My Commission Expires 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this I/ft* day of /l&WtoPl , 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Jeffrey Finley was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE 6. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
S21-AFFID611/8/88nh 
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GLENN C HANNI, #A-1327 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs.
 ; 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
) CHRIS P. SHIPLEY 
Civil No. C87-7726 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, CHRIS P. SHIPLEY, having been duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has been an employee of defendant State 
Farm for approximately three and one-half years, 
2. Affiant is currently employed as an estimator by 
State Farm and has rendered approximately 6,000 property damage 
estimates on behalf of State Farm. 
3. Affiant is aware of approximately 200 of his 
Mti 
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estimates that have had their repair work performed by plaintiffs, 
4. Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on a frequent 
basis, both on the telephone and in person at plaintiffs1 shop. 
5. On numerous occasions, affiant has heard plaintiffs 
verbally abuse and deride affiant's employer, State Farm, and 
affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell. 
6. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch" and a "bastard." 
7. On at least one occasion, affiant has heard plain-
tiff's son, Jeff Christensen, admit that plaintiffs have taken 
unfair advantage of another insurance company. Affiant heard 
Mr. Christensen state that Farmers Insurance had refused to pay 
for a certain repair, so plaintiffs "tacked" the cost of the 
disputed repair onto the tow bill that was submitted to and paid 
by Farmers. 
8. Based upon affiant's experience with plaintiffs and 
other automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, affiant 
is of the opinion that plaintiffs' charges for towing, storage, 
and deposit fees are frequently both unusual and unreasonable. 
9. Affiant is aware of at least on one occasion when 
plaintiffs required a State Farm insured or claimant to pay a 
$300 non-refundable "deposit fee" before permitting an automobile 
to be towed to another repair shop in order to obtain a 
competitive bid. 
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10. Based upon affiant's experience, affiant is of the 
opinion that plaintiffs' facility requires far more supplemental 
repair estimates than other shops located in Salt Lake County. 
11. Affiant is of the opinion that other shops perform 
work of a higher quality than plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs' 
repair charges are above the prevailing competitive rate in Salt 
Lake County. 
12. As a result of plaintiffs' refusal to find State 
Farm's estimates to be "acceptable," affiant and State Farm have 
been required to implement a policy requiring its insureds and 
claimants to obtain competitive bids from two or three other 
repair shops before having repairs performed by plaintiffs. 
13. That the use of such a competitive bid system 
requires far more work and expense on the part of affiant, 
affiant's co-employees, and State Farm's insureds and claimants. 
14. Affiant was told on at least one occasion by plain-
tiff's son, Jeff Christensen, that plaintiffs would not permit 
their competitors to enter their premises in order to obtain 
competitive bids. 
15. Plaintiffs' refusal to allow their competitors on 
the premises has resulted in great inconvenience and additional 
expense to affiant. 
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DATED this /*?* day of /Jcv^^tn^ , 1988. 
CHRIS P. SHIPLEY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jf^-rk— day of 
f\l B* ember 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC O 
Residing at: S o ^ Lake Qc>-~^y 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this / ^ day of/h&ipfa 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Chris P. Shipley was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall w. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
S21-AFFID411/8/88nh 
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-13 27 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS* BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ; 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL, ) 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT 
) ROBERT J. 
Civil No. 
Honorable 
OF 
BORDEN 
C87-7726 
James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, ROBERT J. BORDEN, having been duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has been employed by defendant State Farm 
since 1978. 
2. Affiant is currently employed as a property claims 
trainer and reinspector. Prior to serving in that capacity, aff-
iant served as an estimator and claims representative. 
3. Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on a nearly 
S21 
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weekly basis for the last two years. 
4. Affiant has reinspected hundreds of automobiles 
repaired by automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
5. Affiant has reinspected approximately 50 automo-
biles repaired by plaintiffs. 
6. Based upon these reinspections, affiant believes 
that plaintiffs are more likely than other automobile body shops 
in Salt Lake County to deviate from repair estimates. 
7. Affiant has observed on several occasions that 
certain parts called for under the repair estimates have not been 
placed on the repaired automobile by plaintiffs. 
8. During affiant's visit to plaintiffs1 shop, affiant 
has been subjected to plaintiffs' verbal abuse and derision of 
affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell. 
9. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," that Mr. Maxwell 
is a "unreasonable bastard," that Mr. Maxwell has a personal 
vendetta against plaintiffs, and that State Farm "wants plaintiffs 
to do a substandard job." 
10. Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs 
subject other State Farm employees to verbal abuse and derision. 
11. Affiant has found it very difficult to work with 
plaintiffs on a reasonable basis, and affiant generally finds it 
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distasteful and difficult to work with plaintiffs due to plain-
tiffs' conduct. 
12. Based upon affiant's experience with other 
automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, affiant is of 
the opinion that it takes him three to four times as much time 
and effort to handle a claim through plaintiffs' facility than is 
normally required at other shops. 
13. Based upon affiant's experience, affiant is of the 
opinion that there are many other shops in Salt Lake County that 
do better automobile body repair work than plaintiffs' shop. 
DATED this /&~ day of fioKfth-^ , 1988. 
#6h%uL^ 
ROBERT qX/BORDEN 
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s [QTrv-day of 
K l o V C f A k j r 1988. 
.oo^rn-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing a t : <Sa\A-UtV(? dow-rjry 
My Commission Expires 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Us ///* day of /fa^mt^ , I hereby certify that on thi; 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Robert J. Borden was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall W. Richards 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
S21-AFFID211/8/8 8nh 
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STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS1 BODY & PAINT, INC., a ) 
Utah corporation and BRYAN ) 
CHRISTENSEN, ) AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF 
) LEON MAXWELL 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) Civil No. C87-7726 
vs. ) 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE ) Judge James S. Sawaya 
CO., and LEON MAXWELL, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Affiant, Leon Maxwell, having first been duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Affiant has worked for defendant, State Farm for 
approximately Seventeen (17) years. 
2. Affiant has served as property claim superintendent 
in the State of Utah for State Farm for approximately the 
last six years. 
3. As part of affiant's duties at State Farm, affiant 
regularly compiles and reviews reports summarizing the number 
of claims reported to the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company. 
4. In 1985, the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company had Sixty Nine Thousand Six hundred Eighty 
Five (69,685) reported claims. 
5. In 1986, the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company had Sixty Six Thousand Two Hundred Forty-seven 
(66,247) reported claims. 
6. In 1987, the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company had Sixty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-
seven (65,847) reported claims. 
7. Based upon affiant1s knowledge and experience in the 
automobile insurance claims business in the State of Utah, 
affiant is knowledgeable of the various factors and variables 
that influence the number of reported claims for State Farm 
insureds and claimants. 
8. Based upon affiant's knowledge and experience in the 
automobile insurance claims business in the State of Utah, 
affiant is of the opinion that the decrease in the reported 
number of claims from 1985, to 1987 for the Utah Division 
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is principally 
the result of mild winter conditions prevalent in the State 
of Utah during that same time period. 
9. Affiant holds no ill will toward plaintiffs, nor 
has affiant ever had the intent or purpose to run plaintiffs 
out of the automobile body repair business in the State of 
Utah. 
DATED this JC day of - i : •'<- [ , 1989. 
— / ' ' 
LEON MAXWELL 
A3 2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of , 1987, personally 
appeared before me Leon Maxwell, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he has read and signed the foregoing Amended Affidavit 
of Leon Maxwell, for and the same are true and correct to 
the best of his information, knowledge and belief. 
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